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AN OBSCENITY LAW FOR INDIANA
Joseph O'Meara*
I.
Miller v. California I did much to dispel the utter confusion which
has enveloped obscenity cases for many years. It held as follows.
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest. . . ., (b) whether the work depicts
or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law, and (c)
whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. We do not adopt as
a constitutional standard the "utterly without redeeming social
value" tes of Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra, 383 U.S., at
419 ...
The Court likewise held:
In resolving the inevitably sensitive questions of fact and
law, we must continue to rely on the jury system accompanied
by the safeguards that judges, rules of evidence, presumption
of innocence and other protective features provide, as we do
with rape, murder and a hos5 of other offenses against society
and its individual members.
And it added the following footnote.
The mere fact juries may reach different conclusions as to the
same material does not mean that constitutional rights are
abridged. As this Court observed in Roth v. United States,
supra, 354 U.S. at 492, n. 30, . . . "[-I7t is common ex-
perience that different juries may reach different results
under any criminal statute. That is on2 of the consequences
we accept under our jury system ..
Finally, the Court held:
The adversary system, with lay jurors as the usual ultimate
fact-finders, has historically permitted triers of fact to
draw on the standards of their community, guided always by
limiting instructions on the law. To require a State to
structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national
"community standard" would be an exercise in futility.
*A.B., Xavier University; LL.B., University of Cincinnati;
LL.D., University of Notre Dame; Dean and Professor, Notre
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. . . The jury . . . was explicitly instructed that,
in determining whether the "dominant theme of the material
as a whole . . . appeals to the prurient interest" and in
determining whether the material "goes substantially beyond
customary limits of candor and affronts contemporary community
standards of decency" it was to apply "contemporary community
standards of the State of California."
5
We conclude that neither the State's alleged failure
to offer evidence of "natiorsl standards," nor the trial
court's charge that the jury consider state community standards
were constitutional errors.9
Z -T7he primary concern with requiring a jury to
apply the standard of "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" is to be certain that, so far as material
is not aimed at a deviant group, it will be judged by its
impact on an average person, rather than a particularly
susceptible or sensitive one . . . . We hold the requirement
that the jury evaluate the materials with reference to
"contemporary standards of the State of California" servej
this protective purpose and is constitutionally adequate.
That statement is noteworthy--"constitutionally adequate."
The Court had previously held that
To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around
evidence of a nationa4 "community standard" would be an
exercise in futility.
It now holds that to require the jury to evaluate the materials with
reference to a state-wide standard is "constitutionally adequate." It
does not hold that state-wide standards must be used, only that they may
be used and that a mythical national standard may not.
But there are many communities within a State. "The adversary
system with lay jurors as the usual ultimate fact-finders, has historically
permitted the triers of fact to draw on the standards of their community,
guided always by limiting instructions on the law." (Emphasis supplied)9
Their community, as in the case of other criminal proceedings, is the
county in which trial is held--the forum county. "In short, the only
viable standard is the standard of the community of the time and place; that
is to say, the standard of the jury, for, in our jurisprudential system,
the jury is the community."1 0
It follows that the same book or motion picture may be
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held obscene in one county, not obscene in another. Why not? As suggested
above, the morals and mores of its inhabitants may and do vary within a
State, especially between a rural and a metropolitan area. The very same
difference of attitude and outlook which may result in holding materials
obscene in this county and not in that, influences the result in murder
and other criminal cases and always has. Yet nobody seems to think that
violates the Constitution. On what grounds, then, could it be held that
there is a constitutional violation in the single instance of obscenity
cases?
11
The very same case in the very same county may result in
diametrically opposed verdicts on alternate days. That is not very likely
to happen, but it is an ever-present possibility. And so, by way of a
corrective, judges are allowed to overrule plainly wrong verdicts against
criminal defendants. The chance that a wrong verdict will free a defendant
who ought not be freed is a price we have always been willing to pay for
the jury system.
12
The short of it is that there is no ground for making a
special case of obscenity and granting a preferred status to those charged
with that offense. They are entitled to the same due process as defendants
charged with other kinds of criminal misconduct--the same and no more.
And they receive that when their guilt is passed on by a jury under proper
instructions, subject only to the general supervisory control over verdicts
which judges have traditionally exercised.13 What are proper instructions?
Miller v. California1 4 has answered that. To be sure, it upheld a state-
wide test but, at the same time, indicated that a county test would be
approved--
The adversary system . . . has historically permitted triers
of fact to draw on the standards of their community . . ..
(emphasis supplied)15




Indiana has two overlapping statutes relating to obscene
matter, namely, I.C. 35-30-10-1, I.C. 35-30-10-3, and I.C. 35-30-10-2;
and I.C. 35-30-10.5. Neither is consistent with Miller v. California 16 . Both,
therefore, are unconstitutional. It is submitted that the Indiana statutes
here enumerated should be repealed, and the California statute, as construed
and modified by Miller, enacted to replace them. If this proposal is
adopted, the Indiana statute would read as follows.
Public Law No.
An Act to amend I.C. 1971, 35-30 by adding a new chapter defining and for-
bidding obscene matter and certain acts pertaining thereto,
and imposing penalties.
Be it be enacted by the General Assembly of the State of Indiana:
Section 1. I.C. 1971, 35-30 is amended by adding a new chapter
to be numbered 10.6 and to read as follows:
Sec. 1. Definitions
As used in this chapter:
(a) "Obscene matter" means matter, taken as a whole, the
predominant appeal of which to the average person, applying contemporary
standards of the forum county, i.e., the county in which a person is
prosecuted for an offense under this chapter, is to prurient interest,
i.e., a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; and is
matter which, taken as a whole, goes substantially beyond customary limits
of candor and describes such matter in a patently offensive way; and is
matter which, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political
or scientific value.
(1) The predominant appeal to prurient interest of the matter
is judged with reference to average adults unless it appears from the nature
of the matter or the circumstances of its dissemination, distribution or
exhibition, that it is designed for clearly defined deviant sexual groups,
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in which case the predominant appeal of the matter shall be judged with
reference to its intended recipient group.
(2) In prosecutions under this chapter, where circumstances
of production, presentation, sale, dissemination, distribution, or pub-
licity indicate that matter is being commercially exploited by the defendant
for the sake of its prurient appeal, such evidence is probative with respect
to the nature of the matter
(b) "Matter" means any book, magazine, newspaper or other
printed or written material or any picture, d rawing, photograph, motion
picture, or other pictorial representation or any statute or other figure,
or any recording, transcription or mechanical, chemical or electrical
reproduction or any other articles, equipment, machines or materials.
(c) "Person" means any individual, partnership, firm, associ-
ation, corporation or other legal entity.
(d) "Distribute" means to transfer possession of, whether
with or without consideration.
(e) "Knowingly" means being aware of the character of the
matter.
(f) "Exhibit" means to show.
Sec. 2. Sending or bringing into state for sale or dis-
tribution; printing, exhibiting, distributing or possessing within state
(a) Every person who knowingly sends or causes to be sent,
or causes to be brought, into this state for sale or distribution, or in
this state possesses, prepares, publishes, or prints, with intent to
distribute or to exhibit to others, or who offers to distribute, distributes,
or exhibits to others, any obscene matter is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) The provisions of this section with respect to the
exhibition of, or the possession with intent to exhibit, any obscene
matter shall not apply to a motion picture operator or projectionist who
is employed by a person licensed by any city or county and who is acting
within the scope of his employment, provided that such operator or pro-
jectionist has no financial interest in the place wherein he is so employed.
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Sec. 3. Employment of minor to perform prohibited acts
Every person who, with knowledge that a person is a minor, or
who, while in possession of such facts that he should reasonably know that
such person is a minor, hires, employs, or uses such minor to do or assist
in doing any of the acts described in Section 2, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Sec. 4. Advertising or promoting sale or distribution;
solicitation
Every person who writes, creates, or solicits the publication
or distribution of advertising or other promotional material, or who in
any manner promotes, the sale, distribution, or exhibition of matter
represented or held out by him to be obscene, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Sec. 5. Singing or speaking obscene song, ballad, etc., in
public place
Every person who knowingly sings or speaks any obscene song,
ballad, or other words, in any public place is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Sec. 6. Requiring receipt of obscene matter as condition to
sale or delivery of papers, magazines, books, etc.; denying or threatening
to deny franchise
Every person who, knowingly, as a condition to a sale, allocation,
consignment, or delivery for resale of any paper, magazine, book, periodical,
publication or other merchandise, requires that the purchaser or consignee
receive any obscene matter or who denies or threatens to deny a franchise,
revokes or threatens to revoke, or imposes any penalty, financial or
otherwise, by reason of the failure of any person to accept obscene matter,
or by reason of the return of such obscene matter, is guilty of a mis-
demeanor.
Sec. 7. Defense
It shall be a defense in any prosecution for a violation of
this chapter that the act charged was committed in aid of legitimate
scientific or educational purposes.
Sec. 8. Punishment
(a) Every person who violates Section 2 or 4 is punishable by
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fine of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) plus five dollars ($5)
for each additional unit of material coming within the provisions of this
chapter, which is involved in the offense, not to exceed ten thousand dollars
($10,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than six months
plus one day for each additional unit of material coming within the provisions
of this chapter, and which is involved in the offense, such basic maximum and
additional days not to exceed 360 days in the county jail, or by both such
fine and imprisonment. If such person has previously been convicted of any
offense in this chapter, a violation of Section 2 or 4 is punishable as a
felony.
(b) Every person who violates Section 3 is punishable by fine of
not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000) or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than one year, or by both such fine and such imprisonment.
If such person has been previously convicted of a violation of Section 3, he
is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison not exceeding five years.
(c) Every person who violates Section 6 is punishable by fine
of not more than one thousand dollars ($1,000) or by imprisonment in the county
jail for not more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment. For
a second and subsequent offense he shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two thousand dollars ($2,000) or by imprisonment in the county jail
for not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. If such
person has been twice convicted of a violation of this chapter, a violation of
Section 6 is punishable as a felony.
Sec. 9. Destruction of obscme material upon conviction
Upon the conviction of the accused, the court may, when the
conviction becomes final, order any matter or advertisement, in respect
whereof the accused stands convicted, and which remains in the possession or
under the control of the prosecuting attorney or any law enforcement agency,
to be destroyed, and the court may cause to be destroyed any such material
in its possession or under its control.
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